

Message Text

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TO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6405
SECDEF WASHDC

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USNATO PLEASE PASS TO OTHER EUROPEAN POSTS, AS REQUESTED IN REFTEL

SECDEF FOR GOLDSMITH

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: MNUC SOPN PDIP NATO DA
SUBJ: NPG NEWS CONFERENCE, APRIL 19, 1978

REF: SECDEF 2384 P 211654Z APR 78

1. FOLLOWING IS CORRECTED VERSION OF CONCLUDING PRESS CONFERENCE
APRIL 19 WHICH FOLLOWED NPG CONFERENCE IN FREDERIKSHAVN, DENMARK.
PARTICIPANTS FROM NPG CONFERENCE WERE US SECDEF HAROLD BROWN,
NATO SECGEN JOSEPH LUNS AND DANISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE POUL
SOGAARD. SECGEN LUNS OPENED PRESS CONFERENCE BY EXPRESSING DISMAY
AND SORROW OF GROUP AT WHAT WAS THEN ASSUMED TO BE ALDO MORO'S
DEATH. HE THEN ASKED FOR QUESTIONS. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOW:

Q. I REFER TO THE NEXT TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH IN PAGE 2 IN THE
FINAL COMMUNIQUE. IS THERE ANY SIGN OF ANY POSITIVE SOVIET RESONSE
TO THE RESTRAINT YOU'RE REFERRING TO HERE AND WHAT IT'S BEEN?

A. SECRETARY LUNS: HITHERTO, NO. NEXT QUESTION. YES.

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Q. CAN I FOLLOW UP ON THAT, SIR, WHAT COULD THOSE SIGNS BE?

A. SEC LUNS: THEY COULD BE VARIOUS KINDS. FIRST OF ALL, IT COULD
BE A REPLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS
MATTER MULTILATERALLY AT THE NEXT DISARMAMENT SESSION IN NEW YORK
WHERE VERY MANY PROMINENT POLITICIANS AND MINISTERS WILL BE
PRESENT. IT COULD ALSO BE A PRIVATE TYPE TO WASHINGTON, TO THE
UNITED STATES, THAT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA SHOULD DISCUSS

IT FIRST AMONG THEMSELVES AND THEN WITH THE ALLIANCE. IT MIGHT BE A UNILATERAL DECLARATION. BUT NOTHING OF THE KIND HAS OCCURRED. THE ONLY SIGNS WERE NEGATIVE.

SEC BROWN: THERE HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IT'S TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT THOSE ARE THE FINAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND REACTION.

Q. HOW LONG ARE YOU PREPARED TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION AND AT WHAT STATE WILL YOU MAKE THE FINAL ASSESSMENT AS TO WHETHER THEY HAVE EXERCISED THIS RESTRAINT?

A. SEC LUNS: THERE WOULD BE NO DATES AS YET, BUT I WOULD SUPPOSE IT WOULD BE A COUPLE OF MONTHS, WOULDN'T YOU MR BROWN?

SEC BROWN: THERE'S NO DEALINE AND NONE IS INTENDED. WE'RE GOING AHEAD WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SPECIFIC SYSTEMS INTO WHICH AN ENHANCED RADIATION CAPABILITY COULD BE INCORPORATED, BUT WE'RE NOT INCORPORATING THAT ENHANCED RADIATION CAPABILITY. IT WILL TAKE PERHAPS A YEAR OR PERHAPS EVEN TWO YEARS TO BRING ON THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THOSE PARTICULAR VEHICLES AND AFTER THAT THEN WE COULD, SHOULD THE PRESIDENT SO DECIDE, INCORPORATE ENHANCED RADIATION CHARACTERISTICS IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME. BUT THERE'S NO FIXED DEADLINE FOR SOVIET REACTION.

Q. TALKING ABOUT THIS ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE TESTED A SIMILAR WEAPON IN THE PACIFIC. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THAT?

A. SEC BROWN: I DON'T HAVE ANY COMMENT TO MAKE ON THAT SPECIFIC REPORT. THE US HAS ALSO TESTED THEM. IT'S BEEN A QUESTION OF WHETHER WE SHOULD PRODUCE AND DEPLOY THEM. THE THING TO KEEP IN UNCLASSIFIED

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MIND, THE PRINCIPAL FACT TO KEEP IN MIND, IS THAT SUCH WEAPONS CAN BE TESTED, CAN BE PRODUCED, CAN BE DEPLOYED AND, AT LEAST IN A CLOSED SOCIETY LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, THERE'S NO WAY FOR THOSE OF US NOT PRIVY TO THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS TO KNOW WHETHER ANY OF THOSE THINGS HAVE HAPPENED. SO THAT IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE, THE WEST WOULD HAVE NO BASIS FOR A JUDGEMENT ON WHETHER ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS HAD BEEN TESTED, PRODUCED OR DEPLOYED. IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, I WOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SAID.

Q. SECRETARY BROWN, COULD YOU SAY SOMETHING MORE ABOUT ONE OF THE HANG-UPS IN SALT? THE HANGE-UP ABOUT THE RUSSIAN DEMAND FOR AN ISOLATION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO THE US. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO MEET THAT DEMAND?

A. THE SOVIETS AND US ARE NEGOTIATING, IN SALT, LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND ON CRUISE MISSILE TESTING, THOSE ARE NOT THE SAME LIMITATIONS FOR THOSE TWO ASPECTS. IN RESPECT TO LAND-LAUNCHED, SEA-LAUNCHED CURISE MISSILES, THE LIMITATION WILL APPLY ONLY DURING THAT PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH IS A PERIOD WHOSE LENGTH IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION BUT WE ARE TALKING OF A PERIOD OF 2 OR 3 YEARS. NATURALLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE MEANING OR THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY AND IS PREPARED SO TO STATE. HOWEVER, THE WHOLE QUESTION

OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IS ANOTHER MATTER. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING TO MAKE A COMMITMENT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL IT TRANSFER SOME TECHNOLOGY TO ALLIES, AND I THINK THAT WE CAN WORK OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHAT NONCIRCUMVENTION MEANS.

Q. MAY INTERPRET THAT IN SUCH A WAY THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN A NEW SALT TREATY AND THE RUSSIAN DEMANDS FOR AN ISOLATION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, THEY ARE GOING TO SAY NO TO A NEW TREATY.

A. NO, THAT'S NOT SOMETHING I AM PREPARED TO TAKE BECAUSE ISOLATION OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY IS NOT A TERM THAT IS DEFINED WELL ENOUGH TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. IT ALSO ASSUMES THAT SOMEHOW THE UNITED STATES IS THE SOLE POSSESSOR OF ELECTRONIC OR PROPULSION OR OTHER SYSTEMS THAT OTHER PEOPLE CAN'T REPRODUCE

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AND THAT ISN'T THE CASE.

Q. YOU HAVE THE RUSSIAN DEMAND FOR IT?

A. THAT'S NOT THE CASE EITHER. THE SOVIET POSITION IS BEING DISCUSSED WITH THE US AND I WILL NOT CHARACTERIZE IT IN DETAIL. THOSE TALKS ARE, TO SOME DEGREE, STILL PRIVATE AND WHAT THE SOVIET'S POSITION IS ON THESE MATTERS AND WHAT THE US POSITION IS EXPRESSED IN THOSE TALKS.

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Q. MR SECRETARY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, IN PARTICULAR THE 8-INCH, WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE NEW NUCLEAR SHELLS THAT WILL BE COMING IN AS COMPARED TO THE NEUTRON SHELL; ARE THEY GREATER, LESS OR WHAT?

A. I DON'T WANT TO DISCUSS YIELDS OR WEIGHTS OR OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR DESIGN. THOSE ARE OTHER FEATURES WHICH ARE ALSO NOT YET FOR THE PUBLIC INFORMATION. BUT THEY ARE MORE MODERN IN THE SENSE THAT THEY CAN ALLOW EASIER HANDLING, ONE CAN SHIFT MORE RAPIDLY FROM THE CONVENTIONAL TO NUCLEAR SHELLS. THEY WILL ALLOW CHANGES IN THE RANGE OF THE INCREASE IN THE RANGE OF THE 8-INCH SHELL AND THEREBY ALL THESE CHARACTERISTICS WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF OBSOLESCENCE.

Q. TALKING ABOUT THE CURISE PROTOCOL, DO YOU ENVISION TO REOPEN THE TALKS ON THE PROTOCOL TO GET A COMPENSATION ON THE SS-22 RESULTS.

A. SS-20 IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN SALT UNDER THE GROUND RULES OF SALT II. SALT III TALKS WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT TO BEGIN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SALT II AGREEMENT, WHOSE EXACT TIMING AND PROBABILITY NO ONE KNOWS FOR SURE, WILL, OF COURSE, BE OPEN TO THE RAISING OF NEW TOPICS BY BOTH SIDES. AND I AM NOT PREPARED TO EXCLUDE OR INCLUDE SPECIFIC UNCLASSIFIED

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THINGS FOR THAT NOW. BUT I WOULD NOT EXPECT SS-20 TO BE DISCUSSED OR TO BE INCLUDED IN THAT SALT AGREEMENT.

Q. CAN I FOLLOW UP THAT, SIR, BY ASKING FIRST WHAT'S YOUR BEST PREDICTION NOW ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT AND WHETHER WE WILL WAIT FOR SENATE APPROVAL BEFORE STARTING TO EMBARK ON SALT III?

A. MY OWN JUDGEMENT IS THAT THERE IS A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF A SALT II AGREEMENT SOMETIME THIS YEAR, I WOULDN'T SAY WHETHER IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS OR LATER ON THIS YEAR, BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW. WITH RESPECT TO STARTING SUBSEQUENT TALKS, MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT THE TALKS ON SALT II STARTED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. AND I WOULD EXPECT THAT TO HAPPEN IN THIS CASE AS WELL. THESE THINGS TAKE LONG ENOUGH TO COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION SO THAT I DON'T THINK AN IDLE DELAY IS A GOOD IDEA.

Q. COULD YOU GIVE US YOUR REACTION TO THE SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY IN LIGHT OF GENERAL TORRIJOS' THREAT TO SHUT DOWN THE CANAL IF IT HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY CONGRESS? DID YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, DID THE US HAVE ANY PLANS TO GO IN THERE IN A MILITARY WAY OR WHATEVER AND IF SO, COULD YOU SPELL THIS OUT?

A. I WILL ANSWER THAT QUESTION IN THREE PARTS. THE PASSAGE OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, I THINK, IS A SIGN THAT US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA IN GENERAL AND PANAMA IN PARTICULAR, HAVE COME OF AGE AND IT'S ALSO A SIGN THAT THE US SENATE IS ABLE TO AND DOES APPROVE CORRECT STEPS PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. THE STATEMENTS MADE AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES AS TO WHAT

MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED HAD THEY NOT BEEN RATIFIED, I THINK, ARE DIFFICULT TO ATTACH ANY PARTICULAR WEIGHT TO, NO MATTER WHO THEY'RE MADE BY. I THINK IT WOULD NOT HELP FOR ME TO SAY WHAT THE US SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN HAD THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES NOT BEEN RATIFIED. I WOULD CERTAINLY AGREE THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A GOOD SITUATION FOR ANYONE - PANAMA OR THE UNITED STATES OR ANYONE ELSE. WE DON'T TALK ABOUT MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS. WE UNCLASSIFIED

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HAVE ALL KINDS OF CONTINGENCY PLANS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ALL KINDS OF THEM. SEC LUNS: MAY I ADD THAT TO AN INNOCENT BYSTANDER LIKE MYSELF, IT WOULD SEEM THAT FOR PRES TOOIJOS TO CLOSE THE CANAL WOULD NOT BE VERY EASY. THAT IS ALL I WANTED TO SAY.

A. IN ANY EVENT, MR SECRETARY GENERAL, THE TREATIES PROVIDE THE CANAL WILL BE KEPT OPEN AND NEUTRAL AND AVAILABLE, AND THAT'S THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY AND BOTH PANAMA AND THE US ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO IT.

Q. MR SECRETARY, COULD YOU TELL US SOMETHING MORE ABOUT THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO IN EUROPE, IN PARTICULAR WITH THE OPTION OF LAND-AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND THEIR MATCHING AGAINST THE POSSIBLE RESTRICTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20?

A. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THESE MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH AMONG THE MINISTERS PRESENT AT THE SESSION OF NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. THE UNITED STATES' POSITION AND ACTION ON THE PARTICULAR CLASS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS IS THAT WE CONTINUE TO DEVELOP GROUND-LAUNCHED AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE AND EXPECT THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENT WILL CONTINUE AND CONTINUE TO BE PERMITTED UNDER A SALT II AGREEMENT. THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE DEPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH AS I SAY IS RELATIVELY SHORT, AND DURING WHICH NEITHER GROUND NOR SEA-LAUNCHED MISSILES WOULD BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT IN ANY EVENT AT THE RANGES THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. THAT OPTION WILL REMAIN OPEN AND WILL BE CONSIDERED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT AS ONE THINKS OF LONG TERM NOW, AS OPPOSED TO LONG, MEDIUM RANGE, MEANING DISTANCE, THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE AN OVERALL BALANCE AND ADVERSE TO THE ALLIANCE IN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. I WOULD NOT WANT TO SEPARATE IT VERY NARROWLY INTO RANGES BETWEEN A THOUSAND KILOMETERS AND 1100 KILOMETERS OR 2500 KILOMETERS AND 2600 KILOMETERS. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE HAVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE BOARD AND THE UNITED STATES IS KEEPING THAT OPTION OPEN.

Q. FOLLOWING ON SECRETARY BROWN'S COMMENTS THAT DEFINE THE TERM OF CREDIBILITY PERCEPTIONS, I AM WONDERING WHERE IN HIS VIEW THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION HAS BEEN IMPLYING THAT DETERRENCE IS A MATTER UNCLASSIFIED

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OF CREDIBILITY AND PERCEPTIONS. I AM WONDERING WHERE IN HIS VIEW
THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON NEUTRON WEAPONS LEAVE THE
CREDIBILITY AND DETERRENT VALUE ON THE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A. WHERE IT WAS.

Q. UNCHANGED?

A. UNCHANGED. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ARE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE ARE
A VERY SUBSTANTIAL DETERRENT BECAUSE THE SOVIETS OR ANY PRUDENT
INDIVIDUAL OR ANY PRUDENT GOVERNMENT MUST RECOGNIZE THAT A
MASSIVE ATTACK, A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, CARRIES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK
OF EXCALATION INTO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TACTICAL AT FIRST,
AND THEN WITH A QUITE HIGH POSSIBILITY INTO THE STRATEGIC RANGE.
SO THAT THE DETERRENCE WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE THAT WAY.
ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS WOULD HAVE, OR WOULD IF THEY ARE
DEPLOYED, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. BUT, WOULD NOT, I
BELIEVE CHANGE THE DETERRENT FACTOR.

END OF TRANSCRIPT.

DEAN

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